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Was Bernanke Right? Targeting Asset Prices 




Should the central bank prevent “excessive” asset price dynamics or should it wait until the 
boom spontaneously turns into a crash and intervene only afterwards? The debate over this 
issue goes back at least to the exchange between Bernanke-Gertler (BG) and Cecchetti but has 
not settled yet. In their 1999 paper BG claimed that price stability and financial stability are 
‘highly complementary and mutually consistent objectives’ in a flexible inflation targeting 
regime which ‘dictates that central banks ... should not respond to changes in asset prices, 
except insofar as they signal changes in expected inflation.’ (BG, 1999, p.18). This conclusion 
is straightforward within the variant of the NK-DSGE framework used by BG in which asset 
inflation shows up as a factor ‘augmenting’ the IS curve. In the present paper, we pursue a 
different modelling strategy so that, in the end, asset price dynamics will be incorporated into 
the NK Phillips curve. In our context it is not true anymore that by focusing on inflation the 
central bank is also checking an asset price boom. We put ourselves, therefore, in the best 
position to obtain a significant stabilizing role for asset price targeting. It turns out, however, 
that inflation volatility is higher in the asset price targeting case. After all, therefore, targeting 
asset prices may not be a good idea. 
JEL-Code: E420, E520. 
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Should the central bank prevent ￿excessive￿ asset price dynamics, raising
interest rates to halt an asset price boom or should it wait until the boom
spontaneously turns into a crash and inject liquidity afterwards to attenuate
the fallout on the real economy?
The debate over this crucial issue is at least a decade old ￿if we date
it from the Bernanke-Gertler (1999,2001) (BG hereafter) vs Cecchetti et al.
(2000) exchange ￿but it has not been settled yet. BG got a point at the time,
with the authoritative (at the time) endorsement of Alan Greenspan. Their
conclusion according to which central banks should not attempt to stabilize
asset prices has been the consensus view in the ￿rst half of the decade.
Following the 2007-08 ￿nancial crisis, however, the conventional wisdom has
changed dramatically. Nowadays ￿expecially on the media and in policy
circle ￿it seems to be that asset prices should indeed be stabilized by the
central bank to avoid vicious booms and busts with remarkably negative real
e⁄ects on the macroeconomy.
In this paper we face the same issue with a di⁄erent theoretical framework.
In a sense we put ourselves in the best (theoretical) position to answer a
resounding "yes" to the research question posed above. It turns out, however
￿ somewhat to our surprise ￿ that also in this new framework targeting
asset prices may be destabilizing. Asset prices booms and busts should be
mitigated but a modi￿ed Taylor rule, augmented by asset price dynamics,
may not be the best policy response.
In their 1999 paper BG made essentially the following point: "Central
banks should view price stability and ￿nancial stability as highly comple-
mentary and mutually consistent objectives...the best policy framework for
attaining both objectives is a regime of ￿ exible in￿ ation targeting...The
in￿ ation-targeting approach dictates that central banks should adjust mon-
etary policy actively and pre-emptively to o⁄set incipient in￿ ationary or de-
￿ ationary pressures." (BG, 1999, p.18).
The main rationale for this claim is that "by focusing on the in￿ ation-
ary or de￿ ationary pressures generated by asset price movements, a cen-
tral bank e⁄ectively responds to the toxic side e⁄ects of asset booms and
busts...In￿ ation targeting ...implies that interest rates will tend to rise dur-
ing (in￿ ationary) asset price booms and fall during (de￿ ationary) asset price
busts." (ibidem).
This conclusion is straightforward within the BG variant of the New Key-
3nesian (NK) DSGE framework. In their model, asset price in￿ ation shows
up as a factor "augmenting" the IS curve: An asset price shock, in fact,
yields a net worth or balance sheet e⁄ect on investment (the reference model
is Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999). Essentially the same approach
has been adopted by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007), Iacoviello (2005) and
Monacelli (2008).1 A di⁄erent approach is followed by Airaudo et al. (2007)
who stress the role of the wealth e⁄ect on consumption. Also in this case,
however, asset prices a⁄ect aggregate demand and lead to an "Augmented"
(optimizing) IS curve.
In the BG framework, therefore, a Stock market boom shows up as a
demand shock so that asset prices and in￿ ation move in the same direction.
As a consequence, following the BG modelling strategy, one is led naturally
to conclude that if the central bank follows an in￿ ation targeting approach
there is no need to speci￿cally target asset prices above and beyond in￿ ation.
By stabilizing the latter, it will stabilize also the former.
In this paper we follow a di⁄erent route. In our model in fact, asset price
dynamics will be eventually incorporated into the NK Phillips curve. In the
simpli￿ed economy we consider, in fact, ￿rms have to anticipate wages to
workers before they can cash in sales proceeds. Assuming that ￿rms do not
accumulate internal ￿nance, they need funds at the moment wages have to
be paid. In other words, we explore the same environment as in Ravenna and
Walsh (2006) model of the cost channel. For simplicity, however, we assume
that, in order to raise external ￿nance, ￿rms issue new equities ("equity only"
￿nancing) instead of asking for bank loans.
In our model the return on shares, which is determined by asset price
dynamics, is in turn a determinant of the ￿rms￿marginal cost so that in the
end we obtain an "Augmented" NK Phillips curve.
While in Ravenna-Walsh monetary policy impacts on in￿ ation directly
because the interest rate (on loans) is a determinant of the ￿rm￿ s cost, in
our setting the cost channel is activated indirectly whenever monetary policy
a⁄ects ￿through changes in the interest rate ￿asset price in￿ ation.
As a consequence of this modelling strategy, in our framework a Stock
market boom shows up as a positive supply shock ￿in fact, in a rational
expectations equilibrium it yields a reduction of the return on shares ￿leading
1Iacoviello and Monacelli build rich models in which also the price of real assets (on
the housing market) plays a role. In a sense they blend the BG approach to the Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) emphasis on endogenous borrowing constraints.
4Figure 1: In￿ ation and asset price change (USA)
to lower in￿ ation: asset prices and in￿ ation move in opposite directions. 2 It
is not true any more, in this context, that by focusing on in￿ ation the central
bank is also checking an asset price boom. On the contrary, if the central bank
adopts an in￿ ation targeting approach, in the attempt to stabilize in￿ ation
it will boost Stock prices even further.
The empirical evidence on the correlation between in￿ ation and asset
price changes is mixed and certainly not overwhelmingly in favour of the BG
approach. In ￿gure 1 we report the scatter diagram of in￿ ation3 and the
change in real asset prices4 in the USA from 1970 to 2008.
Linear interpolation returns a negatively sloped regression line. The cor-
relation is ￿0:4, in line with the assumption proposed in the present paper.
2Also De Grauwe (2008) implicitly assumes a negative correlation between asset price
dynamics and in￿ ation (along the NK Phillips curve). In his framework, the marginal
cost is decreasing with the ￿rms￿net worth (because of the external ￿nance premium).
An increase of the asset price pushes up net worth and brings down the external ￿nance
premium, marginal cost and in￿ ation.
3In￿ ation is here de￿ned as the rate of change of the Consumer Price Index.
4Asset price change is de￿ned as the percent deviation of the real asset price (nominal
asset price de￿ ated by the Consumer Price Index) from a linear trend.
5Figure 2: In￿ ation and asset price change (12 countries)
In ￿gure 2 we focus on cross sectional evidence summarized by the scatter
diagram of the mean in￿ ation rate and the mean asset price change5 over the
period 1957Q1-2003Q1 for 12 countries 6 as reported in Chih-Chuan Yeh and
Ching-Fang Chi (2009).
Linear interpolation returns a positively sloped regression line (not shown
in the ￿gure). The linear correlation index is greater than 0,5 in line with
BG. Notice, however, that a quadratic interpolation ￿ts the data much better
7. The relationship between in￿ ation and asset price change over the long
run, therefore, seems to be non-monotonic.
The toy economy we consider is of course a far cry from reality. For rea-
sons of tractability and as a very preliminary step towards a more satisfactory
￿and necessarily more complicated ￿setting, in fact, we abstract from a wide
range of crucial imperfections of ￿nancial markets. The implications of the
5The asset price change is de￿ned as the natural logarithm of the nominal stock index
divided by the consumer price index.
6Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Spain, United States.
7R2 is 0,26 in case of a linear interpolation while it is 0,55 in case of a quadratic
interpolation.
6model, however, are surprisingly far reaching.
We analyse the design and the transmission mechanism of monetary pol-
icy in two regimes:(a) an instrument rule with no-reaction to asset prices
(Strict In￿ ation Targeting, SIT),(b) an instrument rule with reaction to as-
set prices (Asset augmented In￿ ation Targeting, AIT).
In the case of a supply shock, the central bank reacts to in￿ ation by
raising the interest rate, asset prices fall, the output gap turns negative and
dividends fall, the return on shares increases (even if dividends fall) to match
the increase in the real interest rate. The central bank therefore faces a trade
o⁄: An aggressive policy stance aiming at stabilizing in￿ ation would make
the asset price bust even worse. If it takes into account asset price changes
￿i.e. in the AIT case ￿the central bank will ease a bit and therefore in the
end it will mitigate (with respect to the SIT case) the impact on output of
its contractionary policy. On the other hand, however, it will exacerbate the
impact of the shock on in￿ ation. The AIT regime, therefore, is characterized
by milder variations in output but larger changes in in￿ ation.
Consider now a demand shock, which has a positive e⁄ect on in￿ ation
and the output gap (and dividends). As in the previous case, the central
bank reacts to in￿ ation by raising the interest rate. The asset price tends
to increase because of the increase in dividends but the increase of the real
interest rate prompts a ￿ ight from equities which depresses asset prices. In
our model the second e⁄ect prevails over the ￿rst one so that in the end asset
prices fall. If the central bank takes into account asset price changes ￿i.e. in
the AIT case ￿the fall in asset prices will induce a monetary easing so that
the central bank will amplify the impact on output of the demand shock.
On the other hand, it will exacerbate the impact of the shock on in￿ ation.
In the AIT regime, therefore, output grows more than in the SIT case but
in￿ ation will be higher.
In the AIT case, therefore, in￿ ation volatility is always higher while out-
put volatility is higher (lower) in case of a demand (supply) shock. After
all, therefore, targeting asset prices may not be a good idea. At ￿rst sight,
this is surprising because we put ourselves in the best position to obtain a
signi￿cant stabilizing role for asset price targeting. Why is it so? In the end,
as we will show in section 4, in the AIT case the central bank is "too ac-
commodating". Targeting asset prices makes the central bank particularly
"wet". This may be welfare-reducing.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe households￿
and ￿rms￿decision rules. In section 3.1 we derive the Augmented NK Phillips
7curve. In section 4 we evaluate the impact of a Taylor type instrument rule
for monetary policy, with and without asset prices (i.e. in the AIT and SIT
cases). In this section the comparison between the two regimes in case a
demand or a supply shock occur is spelled out in detail. Section 5 is devoted
to some welfare considerations. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Households
The economy is populated by households and ￿rms. The former decide on
consumption, asset holdings (money, bonds, shares) and labour supply.
There is a continuum of unit mass of in￿nitely lived identical households

















where ￿, ￿, ￿;￿;￿ are positive parameters with the usual interpretation, Ct
is a CES aggregator of consumption goods,8 mt := Mt=Pt are real money
balances 9 and Nt represents hours worked. Real money balances show up in
the utility function because they provide liquidity services.
The households￿portfolio consists of money, bonds and shares. The nom-
inal value in t of money balances (resp. Government bonds) carried over
from the past is denoted by Mt￿1 (Bt￿1): Moreover the household owns At￿1
shares, whose price is Qt: In period t the household receives a ￿ ow of interest
payments on Government bonds it￿1Bt￿1 where it￿1 is the nominal interest
rate in t-1. Moreover we assume that ￿rms pay in t (nominal) dividends
equal to Dt per share held in t-1.
The household employs "resources" consisting of wage income, interest
payments, and dividends to consume and increase money, bond and share-
8Ct consists of di⁄erentiated consumption goods produced by monopolistically com-










where e > 1 turns out to be the price elasticity of demand of each good.











[mt￿1 + (1 + it￿1)bt￿1]+(qt + dt)At￿1 (1)
where bt := Bt=Pt are real bond holdings;qt := Qt=Pt is the real price of each
share (asset price or Stock price for short in the following);wt := Wt=Pt is
the real wage; ￿t :=
Pt
Pt￿1
￿ 1 is the in￿ ation rate and dt are dividends per
share.
Liquidity injections (withdrawals) are implemented (by the central bank)
by means of open market purchases (sales) of bonds: Mt￿Mt￿1 = ￿[Bt ￿ (1 + it￿1)Bt￿1]:
Taking into account this procedure, the budget constraint of the repre-
sentative household boils down to: PtCt + Qt (At ￿ At￿1) = WtNt + DtAt￿1.
In the present context, the wage bill WtNt is ￿nanced by means of equity
issues QtAt (see next section). Hence QtAt = WtNt. Using this equality, it
turns out that
PtCt = (Qt + Dt)At￿1 (2)






















subject to a sequence of budget constraints of the form (1). From the ￿rst
order conditions (see appendix A for details) one can derive the usual optimal
relations, i.e. the Euler equations for consumption, money and labour supply:
C
￿￿





















t = wt (6)





Et (qt+1 + dt+1)
qt
(7)
Equation (7) establishes the equality between the return on bonds, i.e.
the real interest rate, and the return on equities, i.e. the sum of the dividend
yield and the capital gain (in real terms). By simple algebra, this condition
can be turned into an asset price equation:10
qt =
Et (qt+1 + dt+1)
1 + it
(1 + Et￿t+1) (8)
From the consumption Euler equation (4) through linearization around
the steady state and taking into account the equilibrium condition Ct = Yt
we get
xt = Etxt+1 ￿
1
￿
(it ￿ Et￿t+1) (9)
where xt denotes the output gap, i.e. the di⁄erence between current output
and ￿ exible price equilibrium output (derived in appendix B), while it denotes
the deviation of the nominal interest rate from the steady state.11
From the asset price equation (8) through linearization we get the Asset
Price (AP) schedule:
^ qt = ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) +
h
￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1
i
(10)
where hatted variables represent percent deviations from the steady state.
In our framework, technology is linear (see next section): Yt = Nt. Moreover,
in equilibrium Ct = Yt. Using these equalities to rewrite the optimality condi-
10Consolidating the No-arbitrage condition and the Consumption Euler equation we get:
C
￿￿
t qt = ￿EtC
￿￿
t+1 (qt+1 + dt+1)
This optimality condition states the equality between the marginal utility the agent
gives up by saving in order to purchase one share and the present value of the marginal
utility the agent will gain one period ahead by transforming the dividend and the capital
gain into consumption.
11In a zero-in￿ ation steady state, the steady state nominal interest rate is equal to the
real interest rate, which in turn is anchored to the rate of time preference (see again
appendix B).
10tion (6) and rearranging we get wt = ￿Y
￿+￿
t . Log-linearizing this expression
around the steady state we get:
^ wt = (￿ + ￿)xt (11)
We assume that ￿rms￿real pro￿ts are paid out to households in the form
of dividends: dt = Yt ￿ wtYt. Substituting the real wage wt as de￿ned above
into this expression and log-linearizing around the s.s. we get:




(￿ + ￿) where ￿ is the mark up. 12 Hence dividends are
an increasing linear function of the output gap.
3 Firms
As in the standard New Keynesian model the corporate sector consists of J
￿rms, indexed by j; which produce di⁄erentiated goods in a monopolistically
competitive setting ￿ la Dixit and Stiglitz using only labour. Therefore ￿rms
incur only the production cost represented by the wage bill.
We depart from the standard setting in assuming the following
a) Financing gap: Technology is represented by a one-to-one production
function Yjt = Njt. Since ￿rms hire workers at the beginning of period
t and sell output at the end of the period, they cannot pay wages out of
sales proceeds: at the beginning of each period they have to anticipate
the wage bill to employees.This is the ￿nancing gap.
b) No internal funds: ￿rms do not accumulate internal ￿nance so that the
￿nancing gap coincides with the wage bill. They have to raise external
￿nance to ￿ll the ￿nancing gap.
In order to concentrate on the role of asset prices in macroeconomic per-
formance, we adopt the following simplifying shortcut:
12￿ = e
e￿1;e > 1:Of course ￿ > ￿. The ratio
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
is the steady state ratio of wages
to dividends.
11c) "Equity only" ￿nancing: there is only one source of external funds, the
Stock market.
Assumptions b) and c) allow us to get rid, in the following, of the compli-
cations due to the accumulation of net worth and to ignore the credit market.
This is patently unrealistic. We consider the present framework as only a
￿rst step towards a more satisfactory and realistic model.
From the "equity only" ￿nancing assumption follows that the j-th ￿rm
raises funds issuing new shares and the amount of shares sold is equal to the
wage bill: 13
wtNjt = qtAjt (13)
d) Dividend and buy-back policy: Shareholders are remunerated by means
of dividends (distributed in t + 1 on shares held in t), which represent
the cost of external funds for the ￿rms. Furthermore ￿rms buy back
all the shares outstanding in t + 1.
The time schedule can be summarized as follows. At the beginning of
period t, the ￿rm issues equities and uses the proceeds to hire workers and
start production. Since production takes an entire period, output will be
available for sale in t+1. Sale proceeds are used in t+1 to pay dividends and
buy back shares issued in t. In fact, as shown above ￿see (2) ￿Pt+1Ct+1 =
(Qt+1 + Dt+1)At. At the beginning of period t + 1, the cycle starts again.
In the end, therefore, we are assuming that in the same period (t+1) the
￿rm is (i) paying dividends and reimbursing shareholders for the shares they
bought in t and (ii) it is issuing new equities to ￿nance production in t + 1.
This is clearly unrealistic but simpli￿es the analysis to a great extent.
From the standard microfoundations of the NK Phillips curve (see sub-
section 3.1, below for technical details), after linearization we get ￿t =
k^ ￿t + ￿Et￿t+1 where k =
(1￿!)(1￿￿!)
! :Substituting (17) and rearranging we
13In principle, each ￿rm issues its own shares so that there should be an entire range
of heterogeneous asset prices, one for each ￿rm. In order to simplify the argument, we
will impose symmetry among ￿rms so that the asset price is uniform across equity-issuing
￿rms. Alternatively, one can think of q as the average Stock market index and assume
that each individual share prices qj is not too far from the average. In the end, however,
￿rms will behave uniformly ￿they are essentially identical ￿so that the individual share
price will coincide with the average.
12get
￿t = ￿xt + k
h
￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1 ￿ ^ qt
i
+ ￿Et￿t+1 (14)
with ￿ := k (￿ + ￿). Equation (14) is the NK Phillips curve in the new
setting.
The di⁄erence with respect to the canonical NK-PC is the term in brack-
ets, i.e. [ ROS (see equation (16)). In fact, the cost channel and the equity-
only ￿nancing assumptions imply that the cost of external ￿nance, which
coincides with the ROS, is a⁄ecting the ￿rms￿pricing decisions and there-
fore in￿ ation. This is the reason why we will de￿ne the equation above the
Augmented New Keynesian-Phillips Curve (A-NKPC).
3.1 The ￿augmented￿NK Phillips curve
The ￿rm￿ s total disbursement occur in t + 1 but are related to operat-
ing costs incurred in t. The ￿rm￿ s total cost in real terms, therefore, is
TCjt = Et (qt+1 + dt+1)Ajt. 14Substituting (13) into this expression we ob-
tain: TCj =
Et (qt+1 + dt+1)
qt
wtNjt. Hence the real marginal cost is:
￿t =




Et (qt+1 + dt+1)
qt
= ROS
is the novelty of this approach. With respect to the standard setting, whereby
￿t = wt; the marginal cost must be augmented by a term which represents
the cost of external ￿nance for the ￿rm. This, in turn, coincides with the








14Since disbursement will occur one period ahead, in t the ￿rm has to form expectations
on the total gross return in t+1 of each share issued in t. This gross return in real terms
is the sum of the asset price and dividends in t+1.
13From the linearization of (15) around the s.s. we get
^ ￿t = ^ wt +
h
￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1 ￿ ^ qt
i
where the expression
￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1 ￿ ^ qt = [ ROS (16)
is the deviation of the ROS from the steady state.15In a symmetric equilibrium
with ￿exible prices all the ￿rms charge the same price Pt equal to a markup
￿ over nominal marginal cost Pt￿t. Therefore ￿t =
1
￿
. Recalling (15) we get
wt =
qt
￿Et (qt+1 + dt+1)
. Plugging (11) into the expression for ^ ￿t above and
rearranging we get:






￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1 ￿ ^ qt
i￿
(17)
In each period a fraction ! of ￿rms is unable to adjust its price. As usual
in a Calvo pricing context ! is a measure of the degree of nominal rigidity.





























Ct+s = Yjt is demand for the j-th ￿rm￿ s product and ￿t is the
marginal (and average) cost.
The optimal relative price of the good produced by the adjusting ￿rm in
period t, therefore, takes into account the stream of future marginal costs,
which, in our framework, depends on current and future asset prices and











4 Monetary policy rules
We will explore the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the case
in which the central bank adopts a simple Taylor-type instrument rule. In
sub-section 4.1 we will assume that the central bank responds only to in-
￿ ation (Strict In￿ ation Targeting, SIT). In section 4.2 we will augment the
instrument rule taking into account asset price dynamics (Asset augmented
In￿ ation targeting, AIT).
4.1 Strict in￿ ation targeting (model I-1)
For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, in this sub-section
we assume that the instrument rule is activated exclusively by the feedback
from in￿ ation (in other words, the central bank does not take into account
the output gap in devising its policy). Hence, the rule speci￿es to:
it = ￿￿￿t (18)
is of the strict in￿ation targeting (SIT) type.
The structural form of the macroeconomic model consists of the IS curve
(9), No-Arbitrage Condition (10), dividend policy (12), Augmented NKPhillips
curve (14) and Taylor rule (18) which we reproduce here for the reader￿ s con-
venience.
xt = Etxt+1 ￿
1
￿
(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + gt
^ qt = ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + ￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1
^ dt = (1 + ￿)xt
￿t = ￿xt + k
h
￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1
i
+ ￿Et￿t+1 + ut
it = ￿￿￿t
(M I-1)
Notice that we have appended a demand shock gt to the IS curve and a
supply shock ut to the Phillips curve to avoid the "divine coincidence". As
usual gt and ut follow an AR(1) process:gt =  gt￿1 + e gt with e gt ￿iid(0;￿2
g);
ut = ￿ut￿1 + e ut with e ut ￿iid(0;￿2
u).
15(M I-1) is a system of ￿ve linear di⁄erence equations in ￿ve state variables,
xt; ^ qt;￿t;it; ^ dt:
The model is recursive. Using the no-arbitrage condition, in fact, we
obtain:
￿t = ￿xt + k (it ￿ Et￿t+1) + ￿Et￿t+1 + ut (M I-0)
xt = Etxt+1 ￿
1
￿
(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + gt
it = ￿￿￿t
These equations form "the core model" with SIT or model I-0, a system
of three equations in xt;￿t;it:
We can solve for these variables without any reference to [ ROS and there-
fore to asset prices and dividends. In fact, we have replaced [ ROS with the
real interest rate it ￿ Et￿t+1, exploiting the no-arbitrage condition. In other
words
Remark 1 If the economy is described by model I-1 the determination of the
asset price and dividends can be separated from the determination of all the
other state variables. The equilibrium values of xt;￿t;it can be logically deter-
mined by solving model I-0 before determining asset prices and dividends.16
The Rational Expectations (RE) equilibrium of model I-0 and the condi-
tions for determinacy are computed in appendix C.
In order to solve the system by the method of undetermined coe¢ cient,
we guess s1 = s1ut + s2gt for each variable s = ￿;x;i. Therefore Etst+1 =
s1￿ut + s2 gt. For the sake of simplicity, we will adopt the following
Assumption 1: ￿ =  :
This assumption is of course restrictive and may entail a modest loss of
generality. It greatly simpli￿es the calculations, however, and yields very
neat results since Etst+1 = ￿(s0ut + s1gt) = ￿st for each and every variable.
Because of assumption 1, the model-consistent (i.e. rational) expectation
of a variable taken in t for t + 1 is a fraction of the current value of the
variable. 17
16A similar dichotomy occurs also in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) albeit in a di⁄erent
context.
17The expected rate of change therefore is decreasing with the current value: Etst+1 ￿
16The RE solutions of the system can be represented as follows:
xt = a1ut + a2gt
￿t = b1ut + b2gt
it = ￿￿b1ut + ￿￿b1gt
where ai and bi;i = 1;2 are polynomials of the "deep parameters" ￿;￿;￿￿;k;￿;￿.
It turns out that a1 < 0;a2 > 0;b1 > 0;b2 > 0 (see appendix M I-1).
In the following we illustrate the transmission of shocks within model I-0
by means of simple diagrams.
From assumption 1 follows that Etxt+1 = ￿xt;Et￿t+1 = ￿￿t. Hence we
can de￿ne the real interest rate as
it ￿ Et￿t+1 = (￿￿ ￿ ￿)￿t (19)
Using (19), M I-0 boils down to:
xt = ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿







1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ k (￿￿ ￿ ￿)
xt +
1
1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ k (￿￿ ￿ ￿)
ut (21)
Equation (20) can be conceived of as a policy induced AD schedule in
the present setting. Equation (21) represents therefore the AS schedule.
Monetary policy a⁄ects the AS schedule through the cost channel.
Assumption 2. We assume ￿ < ￿ and
1 < ￿￿ < ^ ￿￿ (22)
^ ￿￿ : = ￿ +
1 ￿ ￿￿
k
The inequality on the LHS of (22) ￿i.e. ￿￿ > 1 ￿is the Taylor principle.
Thanks to this inequality the RE solution of model I-0 is determinate if ￿ < ￿
(see appendix C for a discussion of determinacy) and the AD schedule is ￿well
st = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)st: This implicitly determines a mean reverting behaviour of that variable.
If a shock hits a variable, causing a departure from the steady state, a negative (stabilizing)
feedback is activated.
17behaved￿ , i.e. downward sloping on the (xt;￿t) plane. 18
The inequality on the RHS of (22) ￿ i.e. ￿￿ < ^ ￿￿ ￿ assures, on the
other hand, that the AS schedule is ￿well behaved￿ , i.e. upward sloping.
When the AD and the AS curves are both well behaved (i.e. they have the
"appropriate slopes"), the solutions of (M I-0) are ￿realistic￿in the precise
sense that equilibrium in￿ ation and the output gap respond to shocks in
the usual way. In other words, the reaction of the central bank to current
in￿ ation must be neither too weak (1 < ￿￿) nor too strong (￿￿ < ^ ￿￿) to
assure well behaved (i.e. realistic) model solutions.
The RHS of (22) is the truly novel feature of this setting. In the absence
of the cost channel, in fact, model M I-0 would boil down to the following
￿canonical￿model which we will label M I-0(c):
￿t = ￿xt + ￿Et￿t+1 + ut
xt = Etxt+1 ￿
1
￿
(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + gt
it = ￿￿￿t
(M I-0(c))
which, after plugging the monetary policy rule into the IS curve and
incorporating model-consistent expectations, becomes:
xt = ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿












Hence only 1 < ￿￿ must be assumed to assure both determinacy and a
downward sloping AD schedule. The AS curve in model M I-0(c), in fact, is
upward sloping for any value of ￿￿. Notice, moreover, that the AS schedule
in the canonical case is ￿ atter than in the presence of the cost channel.
4.1.1 The e⁄ect of a supply shock
We are now ready to examine the transmission of shocks.
Suppose initially there are no shocks: gt = ut = 0. In ￿gure 3 we represent
the AD and the AS schedules in the present setting (in bold) and in the
18Notice that 1 < ￿￿ is a necessary condition for determinacy (if ￿ < ￿) and a su¢ cient
condition for a well behaved AD schedule. In fact, the slope of the AD curve is negative
for ￿ < ￿￿:
18Figure 3: E⁄ects of a supply shock in model I-1
canonical one.
Suppose a (temporary) supply shock hits the economy. In a canonical
setting, in￿ ation goes up by
1
1 ￿ ￿￿
ut on impact (see point B).
In the presence of the cost channel, the reaction of the central bank to the
increase in in￿ ation ￿i.e. the increase of the interest rate ￿adds to in￿ ation
on impact. This is the reason why in￿ ation goes up by
1
1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ k (￿￿ ￿ ￿)
uton
impact (see point B￿ ). In other words, the AS curve augmented with the cost
channel shifts up more than in the canonical case.19
In equilibrium the economy will converge to C￿ . In the end, therefore,
there will be more in￿ ation and a more acute recession than in the canonical
case (compare with C). In the case of a supply shock, the cost channel works
therefore as an ampli￿cation mechanism of the shock.20 Of course, since the
19It is easy to see, however, that the intercepts on the x-axis of the AS and AS(c)
schedules after the shock coincide.
20In fact, in the RE solution the coe¢ cients of in￿ ation and the output gap with respect
to the supply shock are greater in absolute value in the presence of the cost channel. In
symbols: b1 > bc
1, ja1j > jac
1j as shown in appendix C where the superscript c refers to the
canonical NK-DSGE model.
19Figure 4: E⁄ects of a demand shock in model I-1.
shock is temporary, with the passing of time the economy will move back to
point A.
4.1.2 The e⁄ect of a demand shock
In the case of a demand shock, the new (short run) equilibrium will be B￿
as shown in ￿gure 4. The output gap turns positive but, in the presence of
the cost channel, the expansion is weaker and in￿ ation is higher than in the
canonical case (compare with B).
What happens to the stock price? Since the system is recursive we can
solve for the asset price after having solved for the output gap, in￿ ation and
the interest rate. In order to do so, we have to start from dividends. Iterating
(12) one period ahead and taking the expected value we get
Et ^ dt+1 = (1 + ￿)Etxt+1 (25)
When expected dividends are de￿ned as in (25), the no-arbitrage condi-
20tion (10) becomes:21
^ qt = ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + ￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)Etxt+1 (26)
Due to assumption 1, Et^ qt+1 = ￿^ qt and Etxt+1 = ￿xt. Hence using (19)
the expression above boils down to:






(1 + ￿)￿xt (27)
Hence the asset price (i) falls when there is a burst of in￿ ation and (ii)
goes up in a boom, i.e. when the output gap goes up. The reason for (i)
is simple: When the economy is hit by an in￿ ationary shock, the central
bank raises the interest rate prompting a ￿ ight from equities; asset prices
fall bringing about an increase of the return on shares such as to match
the increase of the interest rate. This process re-establishes the no-arbitrage
condition. The reason for (ii) is even more straightforward: An increase of
the output gap yields an increase in pro￿ts and dividends, which translates
into a higher asset price.
As a consequence,the RE solution for ^ q is a linear function of the shocks:
^ qt = c1ut + c2gt (see appendix C) where c1 < 0 while c2 has uncertain sign.
The reason why ^ qt is a decreasing with u is obvious: A supply shock, in fact,
yields an increase of in￿ ation and a decrease of the output gap. As to g;
things are more complicated. A demand shock brings about an increase of
in￿ ation ￿which is detrimental for the Stock market ￿but also an increase
of the output gap, which makes dividends (and asset prices) go up.
The net e⁄ect of these two contrasting tendencies will depend on the
strength of the response of the central bank to in￿ ation. It turns out (see
appendix C for details) that the net e⁄ect is negative ￿i.e. asset prices fall
21Taking (25) into account, the [ ROS becomes
[ ROS = ￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)Etxt+1 ￿ ^ qt
Taking model consistent expectations into account we get:
[ ROS = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)￿xt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿) ^ qt
Therefore [ ROS is not only decreasing with ^ qt (because of the capital gain) but also
increasing with xt (because of the distribution of dividends).
21in the presence of a demand shock ￿if
￿￿ > ￿ ￿￿ (28)




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)￿
i.e. if the response of the central bank is relatively "strong", greater than
a threshold ￿ ￿￿. Notice that this threshold is smaller than the upper limit ^ ￿￿
of condition (22).
4.2 Asset augmented in￿ ation targeting (model I-2)
Let￿ s consider now an augmented interest rate rule for monetary policy which
takes into account not only in￿ ation but also the asset price deviation from
the steady state (asset in￿ ation for short):
it = ￿￿￿t + ￿q^ qt (29)
with ￿q > 0. We will characterize this rule as Asset augmented In￿ ation
Targeting (AIT). In this case, the macroeconomic model in structural form
consists of the IS curve (9), No-Arbitrage Condition (10), dividend policy
(12), Augmented NK Phillips curve (14) and Taylor rule (29). In order to
solve the model it is useful to incorporate dividend policy into the asset price
equation, replacing (10) with (26). In the end we get:
xt = Etxt+1 ￿
1
￿
(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + gt
^ qt = ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + ￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)Etxt+1
￿t = ￿xt + k (it ￿ Et￿t+1) + ￿Et￿t+1 + ut
it = ￿￿￿t + ￿q^ qt
(M I-2)
This is "model I-2", a system of four linear di⁄erence equations in four
variables, xt; ^ qt;￿t;it:
This system is not recursive. In other words, when the central bank
reacts to the asset price, the system does not dichotomize into 2 independent
subsystems (one for xt;￿t;it and the other for ^ qt) as in model I-1.







































i;i = 1;2 are polynomials of the "deep parameters" (see










1 < 0: The
sign of c
q
2 is uncertain. 22
In the following we will illustrate and discuss these results in a simple
modi￿ed AD-AS framework in order to compare the transmission mechanism
of the shocks and contrast it with the previous SIT case.
In the AIT setting, using assumption 1 (so that Est+1 = ￿st, st =
xt;￿t; ^ qt;it) we can write the ex ante real interest rate as follows:
it ￿ Et￿t+1 = (￿￿ ￿ ￿)￿t + ￿q^ qt (30)
In order to solve this model, it is convenient to plug (30) into (26). Using
model consistent expectations one gets
^ qt = ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
￿t +
1 ￿ ￿
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
(1 + ￿)￿xt (31)
It is worth noting that plugging (31) into (29) one gets the following rule








￿ = ￿￿ ￿
￿q (￿￿ ￿ ￿)




￿q (1 ￿ ￿)
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
(1 + ￿)￿
The indirect rule (32) shows that adding asset in￿ ation to a strict in￿ ation
targeting rule, in the end, is equivalent to targeting both in￿ ation and the
22For the con￿guration of numerical values of the parameters speci￿ed below (see section
4.3), the Taylor principle ￿￿ > 1 is a su¢ cient condition for determinacy (assuming, of
course, that ￿q > 0):
23output gap, i.e. to an instrument rule of the ￿exible in￿ation targeting type.
It is worth noting that ￿0
￿ < ￿￿. Moreover ￿0
x > 0:
Remark 2 In the AIT case, the response of the central bank to in￿ation is
weaker than in the SIT case. Moreover, the central bank is indirectly targeting
the output gap.
When the prices of goods and services go up, in fact, the price of assets
goes down as shown by (31). In the AIT case, the contraction of the asset
price will induce a monetary easing, i.e. a reduction of the interest rate with
respect to the case in which the central bank is not concerned with asset
in￿ ation.
Using assumption 1 and substituting (29), model M I-2 boils down to:
￿t =
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ k (￿￿ ￿ ￿)
xt +
k￿q
1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ k (￿￿ ￿ ￿)
^ qt +
1




￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿t ￿
￿q




^ qt = ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
￿t +
1 ￿ ￿
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
(1 + ￿)￿xt
(M I-2bis)
Substituting the third equation, i.e. the asset price equation (31), into
the other equations we get:
xt = ￿a￿t + cgt (33)
￿t = dxt + fut (34)
a =
(1 ￿ ￿￿)(￿￿ ￿ ￿)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
￿




1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
￿




1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
￿
+ k￿q (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)￿
(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿￿
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
￿
￿ k (￿￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
f =
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿￿
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
￿
￿ k (￿￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
24Equation (33) represents the (policy induced) AD schedule in model I-
2 (AD(q) for short). A su¢ cient condition for the AD(q) schedule to be
downward sloping is ￿￿ > 1:
Equation (34) represents the (policy induced) AS schedule in model I-2
(AS(q) for short). The AS(q) schedule is upward sloping if
￿
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
￿
￿
k (￿￿ ￿ ￿) > 0 i.e. if











su¢ cient condition for (35) to be satis￿ed. In other words, if we assume that
the AD and AS schedules in the SIT case are well behaved, then the AD and
AS schedules in the AIT case will always be well behaved.
It is important to compare the slope of the AS schedule in the SIT and
AIT cases which will be labelled AS and AS(q) respectively. After some
algebra we conclude that
Remark 3 The AS(q) schedule is ￿atter than the AS schedule if the response
of the central bank to in￿ation is relatively "strong" i.e. ￿￿ > ￿ ￿￿ where




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)￿
: If, on the contrary, this response is relatively
weak, i.e.￿￿ < ￿ ￿￿, then the AS(q) schedule is steeper than the AS schedule.23
In order to understand the rationale behind this remark, recall ￿rst that,
in the presence of the cost channel, the relationship between the increment







1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ k (￿￿ ￿ ￿)
.
Notice now that, according to (31), the asset price is increasing with the
output gap and decreasing with in￿ ation.
￿ When the output gap turns positive, therefore, the asset price goes up.
In the AIT case, the increase of the asset price will induce monetary









(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ k(￿￿ ￿ ￿)
while that










1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
￿
+ k￿q (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)￿
(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿￿
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
￿
￿ k(￿￿ ￿ ￿)
￿ :
25tightening, i.e. an increase of the interest rate, which translates into an
increase of in￿ ation due to the cost channel. Other things being equal,
this e⁄ect would account for a slope of the AS(q) schedule greater than
the slope of the AS schedule.
￿ On the other hand, induced in￿ ation will bring down the asset price.
The contraction of the asset price associated with in￿ ation will induce
monetary easing, i.e. a reduction of the interest rate, which translates
into a reduction of in￿ ation due to the cost channel. This e⁄ect would
account for a slope of the AS(q) schedule smaller than the slope of the
AS schedule.
If the response of the central bank to in￿ ation is relatively "weak" ("strong"),
the ￿rst (second) e⁄ect will prevail and the AS(q) schedule will be steeper
(￿ atter) than the AS schedule. In the following
Assumption 3: We will assume that the response of the central bank
to in￿ ation is relatively "strong": ￿￿ > ￿ ￿￿:
Assumptions 2 and 3 together imply:
￿ ￿￿ < ￿￿ < ^ ￿￿
and
k <
(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)￿
(1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)￿ + ￿ + ￿]
Notice moreover that when the central bank reacts to ^ qt also the slope of




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
AD
=





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
AD(q)
=
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
￿
+ ￿q (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)￿
(￿￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
In words, when ￿q > 0 the AD curve is steeper ￿on the (xt;￿t) plane
￿than in the case ￿q = 0: In order to understand why, recall that, in the
case ￿q = 0, an increase of in￿ ation brings about a contraction of output







￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
. This is due to the reaction of the
central bank to in￿ ation, i.e. to the increase of the interest rate. In￿ ation,
however, leads to a fall of asset prices. In the case ￿q > 0; the central
bank contrasts this tendency by "easing", i.e. reducing the interest rate with
26Figure 5: E⁄ects of a supply shock in model I-2
respect to the previous interest rate hike. This will make the contractionary






(￿￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
￿
+ ￿q (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)￿
.
Solving (33) (34) gives xt and ￿t as linear functions of the shocks as shown
above.
4.2.1 The e⁄ect of a supply shock
We are now ready to examine the transmission of shocks.
Suppose initially there are no shocks: gt = ut = 0. In ￿gure 5 we represent
the AD and the AS schedules in the case in which ￿q > 0 (AD(q) and AS(q)
in bold). In the absence of shocks in both the SIT and AIT settings the AD
and AS schedules intersect in the origin, point A.
Suppose a supply shock hits the economy. In the SIT case, in￿ ation goes
up by
1
1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ k (￿￿ ￿ ￿)
ut (see point B￿in ￿gure 5, which corresponds to
B￿in ￿gure 3). This burst of in￿ ation incorporates the fact that the central
bank reacts to the shock raising the interest rate, which adds to in￿ ation
27on impact. The increase in in￿ ation makes asset prices go down. When
￿q > 0; the central bank reacts to the fall of asset prices easing a bit so that
the increase of the interest rate ￿and the additional in￿ ation due to the cost
channel ￿will be smaller than in the SIT case (see point B"). In other words,
targeting asset prices will reduce the impact on in￿ ation of a contractionary
monetary policy in the presence of the cost channel.
The central bank then steers the economy to C". Notice that the AD
curve is now steeper than in the SIT case. In the end, therefore, there will
be more in￿ ation and a milder recession than in the case in which the central
bank does not react to asset prices (compare with C￿ ). When a supply shock
hits the economy, therefore, the reaction of the central bank to asset prices
has a mitigating e⁄ect on the change in output but a magnifying e⁄ect on
in￿ ation.24 In the end, the central bank adopts a more accommodating stance
than in the SIT case. In fact the indirect instrument rule (32) shows that by
targeting asset prices the central bank is actually concerned indirectly with
the output gap.
4.2.2 The e⁄ect of a demand shock
In the case of a demand shock, in the AIT case the new short run equilibrium
will be at the intersection B" of the AS(q) curve and the new AD(q) curve
as shown in ￿gure 6. The output gap turns positive and in￿ ation goes up. In
the AIT case, however, the expansion is stronger and in￿ ation is higher than
in the SIT case (compare with B￿ ). When a demand shock hits the economy,
therefore, the reaction of the central bank to asset prices has an e⁄ect of
ampli￿cation on output and in￿ ation with respect to SIT case.
What happens to the stock price? Recall that, as shown in (31) the asset
price (i) falls in response to a burst of in￿ ation and (ii) goes up in the presence
of an increase of the output gap. As a consequence, ^ q is a linear decreasing
function of u because a supply shock yields an increase of in￿ ation and a
decrease of the output gap. An increase of g; on the other hand, brings
about an increase of in￿ ation ￿which is detrimental for the Stock market
￿but also an increase of the output gap, which makes dividends go up (see
appendix D for details). The net e⁄ect of these two contrasting e⁄ects will
depend on the strength of the response of the central bank to in￿ ation. If
the response is relatively strong ￿as we have assumed above (see assumption
24In fact, it runs out that ja
q
1j < ja1j and b
q
1 > b1 (see appendix D).
28Figure 6: E⁄ect of a demand shock in model I-2
3), the asset price will fall.
4.3 Impulse-response functions analysis
In order to provide the usual "pictorial view" of the dynamic behaviour of
the model by means of impulse response functions, we have simulated the
model using the following parameterization: ￿ = 1; k = 0:1;￿ = 2 (so that
￿ = 0:3);￿ = 0:99;￿ = 0:9;￿ = 1:5:
We borrow the calibration of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (￿ = 1)
and ￿ = 0:3 from Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (2000). Having chosen ￿ = 2,
with this parameterization, ￿ < ￿ (as required by assumption 2).
We adopt the following parameter values for the response of monetary
policy to in￿ ation and asset prices: ￿￿ = 1:1 (solid lines) and ￿q = 0:1
(dotted lines) or ￿q = 1 (dashed lines). We use two di⁄erent values for the
response of monetary policy to asset prices, in particular a low value and an
high value to test the robustness of our results.
Impulse-response functions: a supply shock In ￿gure 7 the dotted
(solid) (dashed) lines represent the impulse response functions when a supply
29shock occurs in the AIT (resp. SIT) (resp. AIT with ￿q = 1) case. A
negative supply shock pushes in￿ ation up and the output gap down. Pro￿ts
and dividends follow the dynamic behaviour of the output gap. As expected
(see the discussion above), targeting asset prices makes the recession milder
(with respect to the SIT case) and in￿ ation stronger. Asset prices fall because
of the ￿ ight from equities and of the contraction of dividends but less than
in the SIT case.
As to the interest rate, the reaction of the central bank to the supply
shock makes the interest rate hike bigger in the AIT than in the SIT case.
At ￿rst sight, this is strange. After all, targeting asset prices in a scenario
in which they fall should lead to a monetary easing. The reason for this
apparently odd result, however, is straightforward. As we noticed above,
asset price targeting translates into an accommodating stance of monetary
policy, leading to a big burst of in￿ ation. The interest rate is driven up by
this burst of in￿ ation, the fall in asset prices notwithstanding. In other words
the push of in￿ ation on the interest rate prevails over the mitigating e⁄ect
of the asset price bust. The stabilizing e⁄ect of the AIT rule on output,
dividends and asset prices is o⁄set by the destabilizing e⁄ect on in￿ ation.
Impulse-response functions: a demand shock In ￿gure 8 the dotted
(solid) (dashed) lines represent the impulse response functions when a de-
mand shock occurs in the AIT (resp. SIT) (resp. AIT with ￿q = 1) case.
A demand shock pushes in￿ ation and the output gap up. Pro￿ts and divi-
dends follow the dynamic behaviour of the output gap. As expected (see the
discussion above) targeting asset prices makes both in￿ ation and the boom
stronger (with respect to the SIT case). Asset prices fall because the ￿ ight
from equities more than o⁄set the expansion (due again to assumption 3).
As to the interest rate, the reaction of the central bank to the demand
shock makes the interest rate hike bigger in the AIT than in the SIT case. The
interest rate is driven up by in￿ ation, the fall in asset prices notwithstanding.
In other words the push of in￿ ation on the interest rate prevails over the
mitigating e⁄ect of the asset price fall (as in the case of a supply shock). The
stabilizing e⁄ect of the AIT rule is only on asset prices while the e⁄ect is
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Figure 8: IRFs: a demand shock
325 Some welfare considerations
In order to sharpen our perception of the consequences of Asset In￿ ation
Targeting on the part of the central bank, let￿ s assume that society￿ s prefer-
ences can be represented by a quadratic loss function whose arguments are
in￿ ation and the output gap: 25 L = ￿2
t + ￿x2
t where ￿ is a measure of
aversion to output volatility. Aversion to in￿ ation therefore can be captured
by 1=￿:
In the SIT case, substituting the reduced form of model M I-0 into the
expression above one gets: L = (b1ut + b2gt)
2+￿(a1ut + a2gt)
2 : Rearranging





















































2 > b2. For the sake of comparison,
and with a negligible loss of generality, let￿ s assume ￿2
u = ￿2
g:



































All the di⁄erences in parentheses are negative with the exception of the ￿rst
one.





















￿so that the expression in brackets in (38) is positive ￿the condition is
25Woodford (2003) provides a rationale for this loss function interpreting it as a second
order approximation of the representative consumer￿ s utility function.
33satis￿ed if
￿ > ￿ ￿ (40)



























If, on the contrary, the inequality (39) is reversed so that the expression
in brackets is negative, the condition (38) is never satis￿ed.
In words: AIT is preferable to SIT if:
￿ the reduction in output due to a supply shock in the AIT case a
q2
1 is
"small" enough, i.e. smaller than a threshold ￿ a
q2
1 de￿ned in (39),
￿ society￿ s aversion to output volatility is "high" enough, i.e. higher than
a threshold ￿ ￿ de￿ned in (40).
This proposition can be illustrated graphically as follows. In ￿gure 9
we represent the di⁄erence ￿ = E (L) ￿ E (Lq) as a function of ￿:26 When
￿ > 0; AIT is preferable to SIT and viceversa.
The intercept on the y-axis is always negative. The slope is positive if
condition (39) is satis￿ed, which is the case shown in the ￿gure. In this
case inequality (38) is satis￿ed if the aversion to output volativility is big
enough, i.e. higher than the intercept ￿ ￿ on the x-axis. If condition (39) is
not satis￿ed, the slope of the line becomes negative so that inequality (38)
is never satis￿ed.
Each line is parameterized to a certain level of ￿q: In the ￿gure we repre-
sent two lines. The solid one is parameterized to a low level, which we label
￿L
q : An increase of ￿q from ￿L
q to ￿H
q yields a higher threshold ￿ ￿H. In other
words, if the central bank becomes more reactive to asset prices, it is more
likely that society becomes worse o⁄ with AIT (unless it is extremely averse
to output volatility).
The increasing concave curve in ￿gure 10 is obtained plotting the thresh-
old ￿ ￿ which we obtain from the parameterization adopted to produce the
impulse-response functions (see section 4.3) for di⁄erent values of ￿q:
26E (L) and E (Lq) are de￿ned in (36) and (37) respectively. The di⁄erence ￿ is nor-
malized by the variance of the shock which we assume to be the same for both types of
shocks for simplicity.
34Figure 9: Di⁄erence in loss from SIT and AIT
Points above the curve represents combinations of ￿q and ￿ such that
society prefers AIT to SIT. It is clear that it takes an extremely high aversion
to output volatility for society to prefer AIT even for relatively low values of
￿q:
It is clear therefore that it is highly unlikely that AIT would be preferred
to SIT. Two conditions must be met: (i) the gain in output stabilization due
to AIT in case of a supply shock should be non negligible and (ii) society
should be very averse to output volatility.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a NK-DSGE model in which asset prices will
be eventually incorporated into the NK Phillips curve. This is due to the
assumption of a cost channel for monetary policy which is activated whenever
monetary policy a⁄ects asset prices and therefore the return on shares. The
latter in fact is the cost of external ￿nance in our model. The novelty of
the analysis consists in this peculiar treatment of ￿nancing decisions, which
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Figure 10: ￿ ￿ as a function of ￿q
36We analyse two monetary policy regimes:(a) an instrument rule with no-
reaction to asset prices (Strict In￿ ation Targeting), (b) an instrument rule
with reaction to asset prices (Asset augmented In￿ ation Targeting).
In￿ ation volatility is higher in the AIT scenario irrespective of the type
of shock hitting the economy. As far as output volatility is concerned, in the
case of a supply shock targeting asset prices may attenuate the contractionary
impact of the shock on economic activity but at the cost: Higher in￿ ation. It
turns out, therefore that targeting asset prices may not be a good idea even
if the framework used to explore this issue is much di⁄erent from the BG one.
In the end, in the AIT scenario the central bank adopts an accommodating
policy stance which results in an unsatisfactory macroeconomic performance.
In our setting, the problem with asset price targeting is, in a nutshell,
the violation of Tinbergen Law. By means of an asset augmented Taylor
rule, in fact, the central bank is pursuing two di⁄erent objectives (asset price
stabilization and in￿ ation stabilization) with only one policy instrument, the
interest rate. In order to satisfy Tinbergen Law, a two-pillar approach is
necessary. An interesting proposal in this direction has been put forward by
De Grauwe and Gros (2009). The same point has been forcefully made by
Charlie Bean (2010).
We consider these results encouraging even if this is a very preliminary
exploration of the properties of the model. We want to pursue an appro-
priate generalization because the model has to be enriched to explore more
realistic environments. The most straightforward extension will consist in
incorporating credit markets and credit market imperfections because they
have a major role to play in our "story". The list of possible extensions that
one can imagine, however, is quite long and will ￿gure on top of our research
agenda in the near future.
37A The household￿ s maximization problem























subject to a sequence of budget constraints of the form:


































s￿t+s [Ct+s + mt+s + bt+s + At+sqt+s+







￿ qt+sAt￿1+s ￿ dt+sAt￿1+s]
Solving the problem above we get the following FOCs that hold 8t:
@L
@Ct
= 0 =) C
￿￿
t ￿ ￿t = 0
@L
@mt
= 0 =) ￿ (mt)






= 0 =) ￿￿N
￿
t + ￿twt = 0
@L
@At
= 0 =) ￿￿tqt + ￿Et [￿t+1 (qt+1 + dt+1)] = 0
@L
@bt







From the above conditions we get the Euler equations (4)(5)(6) and the
asset price equation (7) as de￿ned in section 2.
38B Steady states and log-linearization
The economy consists of ￿ve markets: labor, goods, money, bonds, shares.
The equilibrium condition on the goods market is Ct = Yt. Moreover,
Yt = Nt:
In a symmetric ￿ exible price equilibrium all the ￿rms charge the same








Et (qt+1 + dt+1)
:
Plugging Ct = Yt = Nt into (6) and rearranging we get the wage rule
wt = ￿Y
￿+￿
t : Equating these expressions and solving for output we obtain





























In the present setting, therefore, the steady state ￿ exible price equilibrium
output is a fraction ￿
1
￿+￿of the standard one. This is, in a sense, obvious
since the marginal cost is augmented, in the present, context, by the cost of
esternal ￿nance, i.e. the ROS, other things being equal.




￿1 = 1 + r (42)
i.e. in the steady state the real interest rate is anchored to the rate of time
preference r.
Using (42) and imposing the steady state condition in the asset price




￿1 ￿ 1 = r (43)
i.e. in the steady state the dividend yield is constant and equal to the rate
of time preference. From the equation above follows qs = ds=r i.e. a pure
dividend discount model of asset price determination: in the steady state, the
39asset price is the discounted sum of an in￿nite stream of dividends. Therefore




= 1 + r = ￿
￿1
This is obvious: Because of the no-arbitrage condition, the real interest rate
should be equal to the ROS also in the steady state.
C Model I-1
We proceed to the solution of model I-1 in two steps. First we solve model I-
0, which yields the RE solutions for the output gap, in￿ ation and the interest
rate. Then we ￿nd the solution for the asset price.
C.1 Model MI-0
Model I-0 boils down to equations (20) and (21). We solve by the method of
undetermined coe¢ cients. We "guess" the following:
xt = a1ut + a2gt
￿t = b1ut + b2gt
So that, under assumption 1,
Etxt+1 = ￿(a1ut + a2gt)
Et￿t+1 = ￿(b1ut + b2gt)
After some algebra we verify that the conjecture is indeed correct and we














K0 := (1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿) +
k
￿
(￿￿ ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿￿)
Under assumption 2 it turns out that K0 > 0 so that a1 < 0;a2 > 0;b1 >
0;b2 > 0.
The coe¢ cients for the fundamentals based interest rate rule:
it = ￿uut + ￿ugt
can be computed as follows: ￿u = ￿￿b1 > 0;￿g = ￿￿b2 > 0:
The canonical model (without the cost channel) M I-0(c) consists of equa-






















K1 := (1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿) +
k
￿
(￿￿ ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿)
The coe¢ cients have the same sign as the corresponding coe¢ cients of the






The coe¢ cients for the fundamentals based interest rate rule are: ￿u =
￿￿bc
1 > 0;￿g = ￿￿bc
2 > 0:
C.2 Asset prices















Therefore c1 < 0: c2 has uncertain sign: It turns out that c2 < 0 if




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)￿
This completes the solution of model I-1.
C.3 Determinacy
Substituting the monetary policy rule (18) into the IS schedule and the NK
Phillips curve of model I-0 and rearranging, we can write the model in matrix
format:
Zt = AEtZt+1 + BWt
where Zt is the column vector of endogenous variables, EtZt+1 is the column
vector of the expectations taken in t of the endogenous variables in t+1, Wt



















￿ ￿ k + ￿
￿ ￿
1￿￿￿￿
















The RE solution is determinate if the Blanchard-Kahn conditions are
satis￿ed.
Determinacy requires all the eigenvalues of A to lie inside the unit circle.
Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for this to happen are
D < 1
T ￿ D < 1
T + D > ￿1
where D and T denote respectively the determinant and the trace of matrix
A.
After some tedious algebra we reach the following conclusions:
￿ If ￿ < ￿;determinacy requires ￿￿ > 1
￿ If ￿ > ￿;determinacy occurs if and only if 1 < ￿￿ <
2￿ (1 + ￿)
k (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿ 1 :=
￿ ￿￿:
Let￿ s assume ￿ < ￿: From section 4.1 we know that a well behaved AD
curve requires requires ￿￿ > ￿. Hence in order to have both determinacy and
well behaved solutions we have to impose
1 < ￿￿ < ￿ +
1 ￿ ￿￿
k
:= ^ ￿￿ (44)




43Figure 11: Determinacy of RE solution in M I-0.
In case ￿ > ￿, in order to have both determinacy and well behaved
solutions we have to impose
1 < ￿￿ < min(^ ￿￿; ￿ ￿￿) (45)
In ￿gure 11 the downward sloping curve represents the threshold ￿ ￿￿ as a
function of the di⁄erence ￿ ￿ ￿ (when ￿ > ￿): The dashed area represents
the locus of (￿￿;￿ ￿ ￿) points such that both determinacy and well behaved
curves are guaranteed.
D Model I-2
































After some algebra we verify that the conjecture is indeed correct and we










1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
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￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
￿
+ ￿q (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)￿
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(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)￿a
q
1 ￿ (￿￿ ￿ ￿)b
q
1




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)￿a
q
2 ￿ (￿￿ ￿ ￿)b
q
2
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
where
K2 : = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿￿
￿







￿(￿￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿q (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)￿
￿
Under assumption 2 it turns out that K2 > 0. Notice moreover that
￿
















0: The sign of c
q
2 is uncertain.
We can determine the coe¢ cients for the interest rate in the fundamentals
based rule:
it = ￿uut + ￿ugt









This completes the solution of model I-2.
















Substituting the monetary policy rule (29) into the Asset price equation, the
NK Phillips curve and the IS schedule of model I-2 ￿i.e. equations (26),
(14), (9) ￿and rearranging, we can write the model in matrix format:
Zt = AEtZt+1 + BWt
where Zt is the column vector of endogenous variables (￿t;xt;qt), EtZt+1 is
the column vector of the expectations taken in t of the endogenous variables
in t+1, Wt is the column vector of the shocks (ut;gt).Matrix A reads as












entries of matrix ￿ A are


















+ (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(k ￿ ￿)￿q
￿ a13 = ￿ (k ￿ ￿)￿q










￿ a22 = 1 ￿ k￿￿ + ￿q ￿ (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿q (1 ￿ k￿￿) + 1
￿k￿q￿￿
￿
￿ a23 = ￿￿
￿
￿q (1 ￿ k￿￿) + k 1
￿￿q￿￿
￿
￿ a31 = 1 ￿ ￿￿￿














As shown by Brooks (2004) determinacy of the RE solution requires all
the eigenvalues of A to lie inside the unit circle. Necessary and su¢ cient
46Figure 12: Determinacy of Re solutions in M I-2
conditions for the eigenvalues of A to lie inside the unit circle are:
D ￿ 1 < 0
T + D ￿ M ￿ 1 < 0
D
2 ￿ TD + M ￿ 1 < 0
where D, T and M denote respectively the determinant, the trace and the
sum of leading minors of order two of matrix A.
We assume the following parameter values (see section 4.3): ￿ = 1; k =
0:1;￿ = 2 (so that ￿ = 0:3);￿ = 0:99;￿ = 1:5. With this parameterization,
the LHS of each of the three conditions above becomes a function of ￿q and




plane (see ￿gure 12)
It turns out that:
￿ the ￿rst condition (D ￿ 1 < 0) is always satis￿ed for positive ￿q and
￿￿;
￿ the second condition (T + D ￿ M ￿ 1 < 0) is satis￿ed for points lying
above the steep downward sloping curve;
47Figure 13: Magni￿cation of the determinacy area
￿ the third condition (D2 ￿ TD + M ￿ 1 < 0) is satis￿ed for points lying
above the ￿ at downward sloping line.
When the second condition is satis￿ed, therefore, also the third one is





to lie in the dashed region of the plane.
Figure 13 is a magni￿cation of a portion of ￿gure 12.
It is clear that the Taylor principle is a su¢ cient condition for determinacy
whatever the value of ￿q. Notice, however, that one can have determinacy in
this model also when the reaction of the central bank to in￿ ation is not as
aggressive as the Taylor principle would require.
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